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Popper’s Measure of Corroboration and 𝐏 𝒉 𝒃
Darrell P. Rowbottom

This paper shows that Popper’s measure of corroboration is inapplicable if, as Popper
also argued, the logical probability of synthetic universal statements is zero relative to
any evidence that we might possess. It goes on to show that Popper’s definition of
degree of testability, in terms of degree of logical content, suffers from a similar
problem.

1

The Corroboration Function and 𝑃 ℎ 𝑏

2

Degrees of Testability and 𝑃 ℎ 𝑏

1. The Corroboration Function and 𝐏 𝒉 𝒃

Popper ([1983], p. 240) proposes the following measure of corroboration, with
h representing a universal scientific hypothesis, e representing a report on a test of h,
and b representing background information assumed in performing the test:

1                           C ℎ, 𝑒, 𝑏 =   

P 𝑒 ℎ𝑏 − P 𝑒 𝑏
P 𝑒 ℎ𝑏 − P 𝑒ℎ 𝑏 + P 𝑒 𝑏

Degree of corroboration is therefore ‘nothing but a measure of the degree to
which a hypothesis h has been tested, and of the degree to which it has stood up to
tests.’ (Popper [1959], p. 415). It is important theoretically since it ‘is a means of
stating preference with respect to truth’ (Popper [1972], p. 20) and pragmatically
1
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since ‘we should prefer as basis for action the best-tested theory’ (Popper [1972], p.
22).1

The probabilities are to be understood logically—with P 𝑝 defined as P 𝑝 𝑇
where T is any tautology—as Popper ([1983], pp. 284–5) makes clear. However,
Popper ([1959], Appendix *vii) also argues that the logical probability of any
universal hypothesis is zero relative to any finite set of observation statements.2 Thus
if b only contains finitely many observation statements, e.g. statements of initial
conditions, then:

2                           P ℎ 𝑏 = 0

Now we need only note, from the axioms of probability, that:

3                           P 𝑒ℎ 𝑏 = P 𝑒 ℎ𝑏 P ℎ 𝑏

And we may conclude that if b only contains finitely many observation
statements then:

4                           C ℎ, 𝑒, 𝑏 =   

1

P 𝑒 ℎ𝑏 − P 𝑒 𝑏
P 𝑒 ℎ𝑏 + P 𝑒 𝑏

Popper’s views on the significance of corroboration underwent change throughout
his career. For more detail, see Rowbottom [2010], Sections 2.4–2.5.3.
2
In his own words, this is ‘probability relative to some evidence; that is to say,
relative to a singular statement, or to a finite conjunction of singular statements’
(ibid.) Put simply, the idea is that infinitely many theories will be compatible with
those observation statements and that those theories must be assigned equal
probabilities. See Rowbottom [2010], Section 2.3.
2
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In short, the central term on the denominator of (1), which is present for the
purposes of normalization, is defunct. But (4) has various features that render it
unsuitable as a function for measuring corroboration; chiefly, it doesn’t even provide
a suitable ordering of how well theories have fared in response to testing. Compare
two scenarios in which e is found to be true, the first in which P 𝑒 ℎ𝑏 = 1 and
P 𝑒 𝑏 = 0.1, and the second in which P 𝑒 ℎ𝑏 = 0.1 and P 𝑒 𝑏 = 0.01. According
to (4), h is equally corroborated, i.e. has a corroboration value of 9/11, in each
scenario.3 This is patently absurd, however, since in the former scenario e is entailed
by h and b (and discovery of ~e would have falsified the conjunct), whereas in the
latter scenario h makes no notable contribution to predicting e in the presence of b
(and discovery of ~e would hardly have been a blow for h and b).4

But can b contain something other than a finite number of observation
statements, and in a way such that (2) is sometimes false? First, I take it that we
cannot possess infinitely many observation statements. Second, since (1) cannot
concern a test of h if h is entailed by b, for the simple reason that h would make no
predictions above and beyond b, we must conclude that P ℎ 𝑏 < 1 whenever (1) is
applicable.5 This leaves only the possibility, third, that b can contain non-observation
statements, e.g. universal statements such as scientific theories, which render h one of
a finite number of alternatives and/or bear on h more favourably than other competing
hypotheses compatible with b. Is this plausible?

3

In short, (4) is sensitive only to the ratio of P 𝑒 ℎ𝑏 to P 𝑒 𝑏 .
As Popper ([1983], p. 240) stated: ‘The support given by e to h becomes significant
only when… p(e,hb) – p(e,b)>>½’.
5
In the words of Popper ([1959], p. 418), his measure: ‘can be interpreted as a degree
of corroboration only if e is a report on the severest tests we have been able to
design’.	
  
4

3
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Let b* be the subset of b that contains no observation statements. And let’s
start by considering the scientific theories in b*. They cannot be theories inconsistent
with h, because (2) then holds provided that h and b are individually consistent. (For
Popper, as for Carnap and Keynes, the logical view of probability was supposed to be
an extension of classical logic.) So one natural way of thinking, e.g. that a theory like
special relativity might be suggested by background knowledge of Newtonian
mechanics, is precluded; since Newtonian mechanics is incompatible with special
relativity, strictly speaking, b* must not contain Newtonian mechanics in any test of
special relativity. Of course, b* may instead contain the information that the
predictions made using Newtonian mechanics were successful (i.e. right within some
error range) in a wide range of circumstances, i.e. for velocities low enough such that
the gamma factor is approximately equal to one. (And this assumption of the
approximate empirical adequacy of Newtonian mechanics in a peculiar class of
circumstances does go beyond the finite number of observations available, i.e. b.) Yet
this is still compatible with infinitely many theories other than h.

In short, the worry is that if Popper’s argument that the probability of h
relative to any finite number of observation statements is zero is successful, then it
also shows that the probability of h relative to any infinite number of observation
statements predicted by some theory (such as those implied by Newtonian mechanics)
is zero when those only cover a limited range. View h as a curve. Consider
observation statements—feel free to imagine if liked, as it makes no difference in the
present context, that these are infallible—to be points on the curve. For any finite
number of points, there are infinitely many curves that pass through. Now consider an
infinite number of observation statements but only in a peculiar variable range. Here
we will have a segment (or segments) of the curve h, but infinitely many curves
4
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contain this segment (or these segments). Thus if the argument for the logical
probability of h being zero works for finitely many observations, it works for
infinitely many observations (or assumed-to-be-correct predictions) when these are in
a limited range.6 And if they aren’t in a limited range, recall, then they will either
entail h or conflict with h. But as we have seen above, (1) is only applicable when b
neither entails h nor is inconsistent with h! (And if b* entails h or is inconsistent with
h then b entails h or is inconsistent with h because b* is a subset of b.7)

Perhaps there are other relevant items that could be placed in b*? One idea, for
instance, might be to introduce assumptions related to theoretical virtues, such as ‘The
simplest theory compatible with b is the most likely to be true’. Yet even if we
assume that we have an appropriate measure of relative virtuosity—in this example,
of simplicity—this strategy appears to go against the spirit of an anti-inductivist
stance in the philosophy of science, and to question the relevance of Popper’s
argument for (2) in the first place. If we are free to help ourselves to this kind of
assumption, then we will find that finitely many observation statements can grant high
probabilities to theories. ‘Prefer the simplest theories available which are compatible
with the evidence’ may indeed be a methodological rule for Popper, but this is far
from suggesting that simplicity is a guide to truth or falsity (and therefore that

6

Naturally the fact that observations are only made within some error range means
that matters are worse than suggested here; in short, we do not have access to a
segment but only a range of possible segments within the error bars.
7
Donald Gillies suggested, in correspondence, that if we allow h to be a model rather
than a theory (on a syntactic view of theories), e.g. of the Moon’s motion, and then b*
may be understood to contain theories used in its construction, e.g. Newtonian
mechanics, in a non-problematic fashion. This is an interesting idea, but would only
work in limited contexts where two incompatible theories (such as Newtonian
mechanics and relativity) were not being compared. Furthermore, it would constitute
a departure from the Popperian emphasis on theory, and not merely model, testing.
5
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simplicity has anything to do, whatsoever, with corroboration, confirmation, or
falsification).

2. Degree of Testability and 𝐏 𝒉 𝒃

But so what, if (1) becomes (4) and (4) is unfit for purpose? Since the
denominator of (1) is only supposed to fulfill a normalizing role, one might maintain
that the workhorse of the equation, namely the numerator, is of intuitive significance.
One might add that Popper ([1983], p. 242) notes: ‘certain logarithmic formulae may
do just as well – or better for certain purposes’. This is fair. But it is important to note
that if (1) is abandoned for the reasons above then one should also abandon one of the
key ideas behind its introduction, namely that degree of testability is equal to
1 − P ℎ 𝑏 . Popper ([1983], p. 241) expresses this idea as follows:

[I]f p(h,b)≠0, the maximum value which C(h,e,b) can attain is equal to 1 –
p(h,b) and therefore equal to the content of h relative to b, or to its degree of
testability. This makes the degree of testability equal to the maximal degree of
corroboration of h, or to its ‘degree of corroborability’.

Prima facie, as a result of the argument above, one might conclude that all
universal theories are equally testable. But this would not be a happy result for
Popper, given what he says in chapter six of The Logic of Scientific Discovery,
because it would mean that two universal hypotheses were equally testable
irrespective of their relative empirical content. Allow me to explain.

6
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Popper ([1959], Chapter vi) distinguishes between two forms of content,
empirical and logical. In his own words:

I define the empirical content of a statement p as the class of its potential
falsifiers. The logical content is defined… as the class of all non-tautological
statements which are derivable from the statement in question. (Popper [1959],
p. 120)

Popper then relates degree of testability to degree of empirical content; and he
argues that degrees of testability qua degrees of empirical content are crucial in
theory-choice. As the well-known slogan goes, we should prefer bold hypotheses;
bold, that is, precisely in so far as easily falsifiable (and therefore highly testable).8
Consider, for example, “All swans are white” versus “All swans are white or black”.
The former has potential falsifiers which the latter does not, and is therefore
intuitively more testable.

Popper continues by relating logical content to empirical content (and
therefore testability), i.e. the consequence class of a statement (minus tautologies)
with the class of its potential falsifiers, in a variety of fashions. He arrives at the
following thesis:

In comparing degrees of testability or of empirical content we shall… as a rule
– i.e. in the case of purely empirical statements – arrive as the same results as
in comparing logical content, or derivability relations. (Popper [1959], p. 121)
8

Popper ([1959], p. 112) also equates degree of testability with degree of
falsifiablilty: ‘Theories may be more, or less, severely testable; that is to say, more, or
less, easily falsifiable’.
7
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We should consider Popper’s comments about the measure 1 − P ℎ 𝑏 in this
light. As we have seen above, he equates the measure both to ‘degree of testability’
and ‘the content of h relative to b’ (Popper [1983], p. 241). The content in question
here is presumably logical, in so far the measure is defined in terms of logical
probability; i.e. 1 − P ℎ 𝑏 is supposed to be a measure of the logical ‘content of h
relative to b’ (ibid.) Thus it is plausible that Popper has the following thesis in mind:

($)

Degree of empirical content of h relative to b is equal to degree of
logical content of h relative to b.

Even if this is wrong, and Popper does not think ($) is true, he writes of
‘degree of testability or of empirical content’ (Popper [1959], p. 121) and states that
1 − P ℎ 𝑏 is also equal to ‘degree of testability’ (Popper [1983], p. 241).9 Hence he
thinks that:

(£)

Degree of empirical content of h relative to b is equal to
1−P ℎ 𝑏 .

In his own words: ‘corroborability equals testability and empirical content’
(Popper [1983], p. 245) [emphasis in original]. But if the logical probability of “All
swans are white or black” is equal to the logical probability of “All swans are white”
9

It is also possible that Popper was defending a somewhat weaker theory than ($):
(¥) Degree of empirical content of h relative to b is < / = / > degree of
empirical content of h* relative to b* iff degree of logical content of h relative
to b is < / = / > degree of logical content of h* relative to b*.

Thanks to Tim Williamson for drawing this to my attention.
8
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(relative to b), then the degree of empirical content of each is equal (relative to b) on
such a view. And each is a universal hypothesis, so each does have the same logical
probability (relative to b), namely zero, on the argument which led us to reject (1).
Hence (£) is false if degree of empirical content is to be thought of in terms of
potential falsifiers. (The potential falsifiers for “All swans are white or black” are a
proper subset of the potential falsifiers for “All swans are white”.) Derivatively, ($) is
also false if degree of logical content is defined as 1 − P ℎ 𝑏 .10

One could resist this conclusion only by insisting that degree of empirical
content is a coarse-grained measure, such that degree of empirical content of h may be
equal to degree of empirical content of h* even when the potential falsifiers of one are
a proper subset of the potential falsifiers of the other. But to defend (£) in such a way
leads to a dilemma. It forces renunciation either of the claim that degree of testability
is equivalent to degree of empirical content or of the claim that different universal
hypotheses can have different degrees of testability (given that each universal
hypothesis has the same logical probability). Popper would not have wanted to
suggest that “All swans are red or orange or yellow or green or blue or violet or white
or black” is generally as good (qua testable) a hypothesis as “All swans are white”, so
would not have grasped the second horn. To grasp the first, however, gives rise to the
question “In virtue of what, if not greater empirical content, is ‘All swans are white’
more testable than ‘All swans are red or orange or… white or black’?” The difficulty
of arriving at a satisfactory answer strongly suggests that rejecting (£), and avoiding
the dilemma altogether, would be a preferable option. Then, to repeat, ($) must be
rejected too.
10

(¥) is also false if degree of logical content is defined in this way, by the same
reasoning. Let b be b*, and let h be “All swans are white or black” and h* be “All
swans are white”.
9
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